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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
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V.

BRANWYN FITSCHEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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)
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NO. 47419-2019
ADA COUNTY NO. CR0l-18-59187

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Branwyn Fitschen pleaded guilty to Possession of a Controlled Substance and received a
unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, and the court retained jurisdiction. Mindful
that Ms. Fitschen asked for probation at sentencing, and that she has since been released on
probation, she appeals and argues that the court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In mid-December 2018, Ms. Fitschen was pulled over by a Meridian police officer for
driving a vehicle with an expired registration. (PSI, p.3.) The officer discovered active warrants
for Ms. Fitschen out of both Valley County and Ada County. (PSI, p.116.) After detaining her, a
drug detection canine unit alerted on the vehicle. (PS I, p .116.) After a search of the vehicle
revealed methamphetamine, Ms. Fitschen was arrested. (PSI, p.116.) A complaint was filed with
charges of possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.9-10.)
Ms. Fitschen was released after posting bond. (R., p.19.) Ms. Fitschen waived her preliminary
hearing and was bound over to the district court on those charges. (R., pp.22-23.) Ms. Fitschen
then began the process of applying to a problem-solving court. (R., p.24.)
An Information was filed charging Ms. Fitschen with the same charges contained in the
complaint. (R., pp.30-31 Ms. Fitschen pied guilty to the charge of possession of a controlled
substance, and in exchange for her plea, the State would dismiss the other charge and
recommend probation with an underlying sentence of five years, with two years fixed. (R., p.82;

see also Tr., p.6, Ls.20-23.) At sentencing, was freed from its sentencing recommendation.
(Tr., p.23, Ls.12-20.) The State asked "for a sentence of two years fixed followed by five years
indeterminate, for a total of seven years. And the State is asking the Court to retain jurisdiction."
(Tr., p.23, Ls.21-25.) Ms. Fitschen asked for a sentence of four years, with one year fixed, and
for that sentence to be suspended and for her to be placed on probation for four years. (Tr., p.34,
Ls.16-21.) Ms. Fitschen was sentenced to a unified term of five years, with two years fixed, and
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the court retaining jurisdiction. (R., p.111.) A Judgment of Conviction was entered. (R., pp.11315.) Ms. Fitschen timely appealed from the Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.120-21.) 1

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by failing to place Ms. Fitschen on probation and
instead imposing a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, with the court retaining
jurisdiction, following her plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Place Ms. Fitschen On Probation
And Instead Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Five Years, With Two Years Fixed, With The
Court Retaining Jurisdiction, Following Her Plea Of Guilty To Possession Of A Controlled
Substance

A.

Introduction
"A case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a

legally cognizable interest in the outcome. A case is moot if it presents no justiciable controversy
and a judicial determination will have no practical effect upon the outcome." State v.

Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 419 (2012) (citation omitted). Here, the district court retained
jurisdiction after sentencing Ms. Fitschen. (R., pp.113-15.) Ms. Fitschen has since been placed
on probation after the rider. 2 Mindful of the mootness doctrine, and that Ms. Fitschen was placed
on probation after the rider, she maintains the district court erred by imposing an excessive
sentence.

1

Ms. Fitschen filed a Motion for Reduction of Sentence which was denied by the district court.
(See iCourt.) However, she does not appeal that denial as it is moot given her release on
probation.
2
iCourt reflects that on March 25, 2020, Ms. Fitschen was placed on probation for five years,
retroactive to her sentencing date. (Order Suspending Sentence After Retained Jurisdiction And
Order of Probation, dated March 25, 2020).
3

B.

Standard Of Review
A court's decisions at sentencing are generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567 (Ct. App. 1982) (The Idaho "Supreme Court has applied a
general standard of "clear abuse of discretion" to appellate review of sentencing decisions"
(citing State v. Ogata, 95 Idaho 309, 508 P.2d 141 (1973)).
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (emphasis in original). "However, in
exercising that discretion, reasonableness is a fundamental requirement." State v. Nice, 103 Idaho
89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982) (citing State v. Dillon, 100 Idaho 723, 604 P.2d 737 (1979)).

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence
Ms. Fitschen asserts the district court imposed an excessive sentence by not adequately

considering mitigating evidence concerning her mental health and drug addiction, lack of
criminal history, good character, family support, employability and positive work history, and
remorse and willingness for treatment. State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002) (noting that
when reviewing a sentence, Idaho's appellate courts will "review the record on appeal, having
due regard for the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the
public interest"); State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007) (same).
"[I] f mental condition is a significant factor," a trial court is required to consider the
defendant's mental illness using "factors listed in LC. § 19-2523." Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho
573, 581 (1999); see also State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 391-92 (1994) ("Idaho Code § 194

2523, which requires that the trial court consider the defendant's mental illness as a sentencing
factor, was an integral part of the legislature's repeal of mental condition as a defense."). "The
sentencing court is not required to recite each of the factors listed. The record need only show
that the court adequately considered the substance of the factors in arriving at its sentencing
decision." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 461 (2002) (citing Fenstermaker v. State, 128 Idaho
285 (Ct.App.1995)). And where a court does not "give proper consideration of the defendant's
[substance abuse] problem, the part it played in causing defendant to commit the crime[, or] the
suggested alternatives for treating the problem," it may be an abuse of discretion. See State v.
Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982).

Here, Ms. Fitschen acknowledges that she has mental health and substance abuse
problems and asserts those concerns would have been better addressed in the community. In the
guilty plea advisory form, she stated that she had "been diagnosed with a mental health
disorder." (Tr., p.9, Ls.14-19; R., p.85.) At sentencing, counsel for Ms. Fitschen said, "I think
that her drug use is very much intertwined with mental health issues. I think she suffers from
some pretty significant depression, and I think that it's hand in hand with methamphetamine
use." (Tr., p.29, Ls.21-25.) This was made evident when, shortly after pleading guilty,
Ms. Fitschen was admitted to the hospital after attempting suicide. (Tr., p.25, Ls.17-21; PSI,
p.13.) The PSI notes that after that attempt, Ms. Fitschen "was diagnosed with major depressive
illness, moderate to severe and methamphetamine use disorder, moderate to severe." (PSI, p.13.)
One of the physicians who evaluated her during that time noted that she was "lacking in insight,
[was] very concrete, black and white in her thinking and [was] catastrophizing her situation."
(PSI. p.13.) That physician also stated she was "minimizing her drug use and the need for mental
health treatment." (PSI, p.13.)
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At sentencing, her attorney discussed that when the public defender's office sees civil
commitments for mental health reasons, they were generally for just "two or three days," but that
Ms. Fitschen was hospitalized for two weeks. (Tr., p.30, Ls.8-12.) Ms. Fitschen tried to
downplay that incident as "a little breakdown," but acknowledged that she "did have some
issues, certainly" and stated that she had "been doing better since [she] was released from
behavioral health." (Tr., p.36, Ls.19-22.) The court stated, "with your suicide attempt here, I'm
quite concerned about you." (Tr., p.39, Ls.23-24.)
Ms. Fitschen also recognizes that throughout her pretrial release, she struggled to comply
with the terms of that release, including failing multiple urinalysis tests ("UA's"). (See, e.g.,
R., pp.103-08 (Affidavit of pretrial case manager detailing problems, including failed UA's).)
The state said "she was positive for methamphetamine on -- I count 11 different occasions."
(Tr., p.26, Ls.23-25.) She asserts, in the words of her counsel, that "her drug use is very much
intertwined with [her] mental health issues." (Tr., p.29, Ls.21-22.) However, instead of allowing
her to find inpatient or outpatient treatment in the community for her mental health and
substance abuse issues, the court said, "what's going to happen is I'm going to send you on a
rider. (Tr., p.39, Ls.24-25.) Ms. Fitschen asserts, mindful of the fact that she is now on probation,
that this was an abuse of discretion.
Ms. Fitschen also asserts that the court did not adequately consider her lack of criminal
history, general good character, and familial support when it retained jurisdiction. See State v.
Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 224 (1985) ("The sentencing judge found several mitigating factors,

including Caudill's youthful age, prior nonviolent nature, lack of prior criminal record, potential
for rehabilitation, and remorse."); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991) (reducing
the defendant's aggregate sentence based, in part, on the "other positive attributes of his
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character"); State v. Baiz, 120 Idaho 292, 293 (Ct. App. 1991) (treating the fact that the
defendant "had considerable family support and was well liked by his friends" as mitigating, but
nevertheless affirming his concurrent fifteen years sentences for two counts of delivery of
heroin).
At her change of plea hearing, counsel for Ms. Fitschen said, "she really has no record.
She's 49, Judge, and [only] has a 2016 DUI from Valley County." (Tr., p.13, Ls.20-23.) At
sentencing, the State recognized that this case was Ms. Fitschen's first felony. (Tr., p.27, Ls.8-10
("This case ... is her first felony, so we recognize that").) Ms. Fitschen has also had people with
her in the courtroom at multiple hearings supporting her. (See Tr., p.13, Ls.15-16 ("She does
have people in her comer. They come to a lot of court dates with her").) At the change of plea
hearing, she had "her sister and friend with her [there] in support of her." (Tr., p.13, Ls.13-14.)
And at sentencing, Ms. Fitschen's sister and aunt were at the hearing supporting her, and letters
from multiple people in support were submitted for the court's consideration before sentencing.
(Tr., p.28, Ls.6-12.) At sentencing, the court said it "appreciate[ d] her background," but still
imposed a five-year sentence, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.37, Ls.1821.) Ms. Fitschen asserts this was an abuse of discretion.
Ms. Fitschen also asserts that her lengthy job history and educational background were
mitigating factors that should have weighed in favor of probation. See State v. Shideler, 103
Idaho 593, 595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who, inter alia, had been steadily
employed, enjoyed his work, and expressed a desire to advance within his company), State v.
Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 119 (1955) (finding that it was error for court to fail to consider, inter
alia, a defendant's gainful employment in determining the appropriate sentence); also State v.
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Hagedorn, 129 Idaho 155, 161 (Ct. App. 1996) (approvingly referencing the district court's

consideration of the defendant's good employment history in mitigation).
Ms. Fitschen graduated "magna cum laude" from Boise State University. (Tr., p.31,
Ls.22-23; see also PSI, pp.33-36.) At the change of plea hearing, Ms. Fitschen's counsel told the
court, "She's employed with the Idaho Department of Labor as, I think, a claims examiner. And
she's been there ... [a]lmost ten years." (Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.14, L.3.) He also said, "She is
wanting to resolve this case in a way that hopefully will preserve her job at the Department of
Labor." (Tr., p.14, Ls.12-14.). At sentencing, Ms. Fitschen told the court that one of her driving
goals in asking for probation was the opportunity to possibly "salvage [her] job" with disability
determination services. (See Tr., p.35, L.22 - p.36, L.14.) The court said, "Ms. Fitschen, I
appreciate you have a good job. I appreciate that was a very important thing for you to like to
keep. I appreciate your background." (Tr., p.37, Ls.18-21.) However, the court still imposed
sentence and retained jurisdiction, causing Ms. Fitschen to tell the court, "I'm going to lose my
house, and the opportunity I had to salvage my employment is out the window." (Tr., p.42, Ls.57.) Accordingly, Ms. Fitschen asserts the court's sentence was an abuse of discretion.
Ms. Fitschen also asserts the court did not fully consider her acceptance of responsibility
for her actions, nor her amenability to treatment. See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595, 651
P.2d 527, 529 (1982) (reducing indeterminate portion of sentence based on, among other factors,
defendant's voluntary drug addiction rehabilitation and acceptance of responsibility for his
actions); State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 171 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Coffin points to several
mitigating circumstances [including] his willingness to seek treatment for an alcohol problem").
Here, Ms. Fitschen acknowledged her drug addiction problem and expressed a desire to
find treatment for that problem. (Tr., p.37, Ls.4-7 ("I know that I do have problems, and I'm
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working on getting those addressed and facing them and acknowledging that they are
problems").) Yet despite her acknowledgements, the court still imposed sentence after discussing
its experience as a drug court judge and what it considered appropriate reactions for individuals
with drug addiction problems. (Tr., p.38, L.19 - p.39, L.8.) When acknowledging Ms. Fitschen's
desire to "get on top of this [problem] herself," the court said it had seen that same desire "in a
lot of people, but that's not proved true." (Tr., p.39, Ls.10-13.) The court said that because she
wasn't successful on pretrial release, it was "quite concerned about" her and didn't believe she
would be successful on probation. (See Tr., p.39, L.13 - p.40, L.5.) Ms. Fitschen asserts those
statements show the court did not adequately consider her acceptance of responsibility for her
actions, nor her desire to treat her drug addiction, thus abusing its discretion.

CONCLUSION
Mindful of the fact that she has been released on probation, Ms. Fitschen respectfully
requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 31 st day of March, 2020.

/s/ R. Jonathon Shirts
R. JONATHAN SHIRTS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 31 st day of March, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

RJS/eas
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